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CORPORATE LAW
ALFRED D. MATHEWSON*
INTRODUCTION
This Article reviews certain changes in several areas of New Mexico
corporate law under the 1983 Amendments' (the "New Mexico Amend-
ments") to the New Mexico Business Corporation Act2 (the "Act") and
those New Mexico decisions between 1982 and 1986 that have contributed
to the development of New Mexico corporate law. While the New Mexico
Amendments were covered in some depth in Perelson & Compton, 1983
Amendments to the New Mexico Business Corporation Act and Related
Statutes, 3 at least three areas deserve special or repeated emphasis: (1)
the manner in which New Mexico's complete abolition of par value differs
from comparable provisions in the Model Business Corporation Act (the
"MBCA"); (2) the renewed utility of the de facto corporation doctrine;
and (3) the conditional nature of the applicability of the new shareholder
majority vote provisions. The first two areas are of special concern be-
cause they depart from comparable provisions in both the 1980 amend-
ments to the MBCA from which they were derived as well as the Revised
MBCA of 1984' (the "1984 Revised MBCA"). The third area describes
pitfalls waiting for the unwary practitioner who relies on complete cross-
indexing of related statutory provisions in the New Mexico Amendments.
The New Mexico cases reviewed fall into three groups. In the first
group, the courts clarify existing law on the disregard of the corporate
entity to impose liability for corporate obligations on shareholders. The
second group develops New Mexico law pertaining to the rights of mi-
nority shareholders challenging the conduct of management controlled
by majority shareholders. The final group involves the clarification of
existing law on the personal jurisdiction of New Mexico courts over
foreign corporations under the New Mexico Long-Arm Statute. This
discussion, primarily intended for corporate practitioners, should prove
useful to anyone desiring information about the state of corporate law in
New Mexico.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. The author would like
to thank Dean Theodore Parnall for his very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. 1983 N.M. Laws, ch. 304, 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 31, 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 67.
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§53-11-1 through 53-18-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
3. 14 N.M. L. REV. 371 (1984).
4. REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr (1984).
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I. TROUBLE SPOTS UNDER THE 1983 AMENDMENTS
A. The Abolition of Par Value: Beyond the MBCA
The 1980 amendments to the MBCA were intended to abolish the
concept of par value and eliminate the artificiality of the legal capital and
distribution provisions.5 These objectives were accomplished in part by
amending the appropriate sections to delete all but one of the references
to par value.6 Section 54(3) of the MBCA, permitting the inclusion of
provisions on par value in the articles of incorporation, became the sole
MBCA reference to what had been the lodestar of the law of legal capital.
The New Mexico Amendments went beyond the amended MBCA and
deleted all references to the term "par value," including the section 54(3)
equivalent, from the New Mexico Business Corporation Act. As an al-
ternative to par value the New Mexico Amendments permit the inclusion
in the articles of incorporation of provisions setting forth the "minimum
consideration" to be paid for shares.7
On its face, the "minimum consideration" language, while a deviation
from the MBCA, seems innocuous and consistent with the abrogation of
the concept of par value. Moreover, the inclusion of the "minimum
consideration" provision might have been intended to provide symmetry
between section 53-12-2(B)(3), the New Mexico version of section 54(3)
of the MBCA, and section 53-11-18 of the Act which authorizes the
issuance of shares "for such consideration as shall be authorized by the
board of directors establishing a price . . . or a minimum price . .. "
subject to restrictions in the articles of incorporation. Under such rea-
soning, section 53-12-2(B)(3) merely provides for the inclusion in the
articles of incorporation of the restrictions authorized in section 53-11-
18.
Unfortunately, the variance of section 53-12-2(B)(3) from its equivalent
in both the 1980 amendments to the MBCA and the 1984 Revised MBCA
raises several questions for existing New Mexico corporations and newly
chartered New Mexico corporations desiring to use par value. The de-
cision by the drafters of the 1980 MBCA amendments to permit the
inclusion of provisions on par value was not a mere accommodation of
practitioners reluctant to change.
5. A Report of Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-
Amendments to Financial Provisions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1867-69 (1979); B. MANNING, A CONCISE
TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPrrAL 165-66 (2d ed. 1981).
6. The deletion of the term "par value" was not equivalent to the establishment of universal "no-
par" shares. Even no-par shares are subject to legal capital requirements. However, the portion of
the consideration paid for them allocated to stated capital is determined by the board of directors
and, consequently, is not required to be included in a public document. Under the 1980 amendments
to the MBCA, no-par shares are irrelevant since none of the consideration is treated as legal capital.
7. N.M. STAT. ANN. §53-12-2(B)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
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Inclusion of the provisions was permitted for two significant reasons.
First, all corporations in existence on the date of adoption of the 1980
Amendments would have provisions on par value in their articles of
incorporation which would continue to exist although the term "par value"
is without legal effect.8 Second, a corporation may attempt to qualify to
do business in another jurisdiction in which franchise taxes are computed
on the basis of par value. 9 Other jurisdictions that have abolished par
value but permit the inclusion of provisions in articles of incorporation
either expressly delineate the purposes for which it may be included or
follow the MBCA section 54(3) language.' ° The New Mexico Amend-
ments, by excluding all references to par value, fail to take account of
these concerns. More significantly, they may also resurrect watered stock" 1
problems that the deletion of "par value" in the MBCA was designed at
least in part to eliminate.' 2
As noted above, the New Mexico Amendments use the term "minimum
consideration" in lieu of "par value" in section 53-12-2(B)(3). All New
Mexico corporations formed prior to the effective date of the 1983 Amend-
ments ("Pre-amendment Corporations") include provisions in their ar-
ticles of incorporation for "par value" or "no par value" stock.' 3 The
effect of such provisions is now unclear under New Mexico law. Many
corporations formed after the effective date of the New Mexico Amend-
ments ("Post-amendment Corporations") have, as a practical matter,
frequently included provisions for "par value" or "no par value" stock
in their articles of incorporation. "4 The effect of such provisions is also
unclear. The lack of statutory guidance leaves room for too many spec-
ulative arguments: for example, the validity of shares issued, rights of
8. See supra note 5.
9. id. The amount of the franchise tax may be determined by multiplying the stated capital of
the corporation by the franchise tax rate.
10. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 205, 409 and 418 (West 1977) (not based upon 1980 MBCA amendments
but expressly providing that par value may be used for the purpose of determining any tax or franchise
fee computed on the basis of par value and establishing par value at $1.00 per share); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 302A.401, 302A.405 (West 1985) (expressly permitting par value for purpose of determining
franchise taxes and fees but establishing par value at $0.01 per share); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
§§ 6.25, 6.30, 6.35 (Smith-Hurd 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-605, -606, -610 (1985); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-643 (Repl. Vol. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § § 23A.08.150, .160, 23A.08.190.
See also REv. MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr § 2.02(B)(2)(iv)(1984).
I1. Watered stock is commonly thought of as stock issued for less than par value but technically
it is any stock issued for less than the amount of consideration required by law.
12. See supra note 5.
13. Prior to the 1983 Amendments, the Act required a corporation's articles of incorporation to
include a provision establishing the par value of shares or declaring all shares to be without par
value. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2(A)(4) (1978) (amended 1983).
14. The Corporations Department of the State Corporation Commission confirmed that it continues
to accept articles of incorporation containing par value provisions. The justification for this admin-
istrative decision is that other states use par value to compute franchise taxes.
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corporate creditors, and the obligation of shareholders, to afford any cold
comfort to the cautious practitioner.
Prior to the New Mexico Amendments, the Act, following the MBCA,
addressed watered stock in two statutory provisions. Section 53-11-25," s
based upon a breach of contract theory, provided for liability for pur-
chasers of shares from the corporation who tendered less than the full
consideration agreed upon. The second section, 53-11-18,6 was based
upon a statutory obligation theory and prohibited the issuance of shares
for consideration in an amount less than the par value. Unlike section
53-11-25, however, section 53-11-18 did not specify the legal conse-
quences of a failure of the shareholder to pay in at least par value.
The origins of watered stock doctrine are rooted in the common law
rather than statutes. Watered stock remedies are equitable in nature and
several theoretical bases have been articulated in the cases, including the
contract and statutory obligation theories. Thus, even though the drafters
of the 1980 Amendments did not so intend, it was still possible for a
watered stock problem to arise under the MBCA using one of the various
traditional watered stock theories. For example, in section 18 of the
MBCA, as amended by the 1980 Amendments, the board of directors
was authorized to establish a "minimum price" per share subject to
restrictions in the articles of incorporation. Notwithstanding the intentions
of the drafters of the 1980 Amendments, watered stock liability arguably
might arise whenever a board of directors established a "minimum price."
Watered stock would then involve stock issued for consideration with a
value less than the minimum price set by the board of directors. Into this
maze stepped the New Mexico Amendments, which not only included
the "minimum price" language in the New Mexico version of section
18I 7 of the MBCA, but also substituted the "minimum consideration"
language in the New Mexico equivalent of section 54(3) of the MBCA. 18
The drafters of the 1984 Revised MBCA deleted the minimum price
language in a complete revampment of the shareholder pay-in provi-
sions. 9 In section 6.21, they also provided for a mandatory determination
of the adequacy of consideration by the board of directors.2o That deter-
mination is conclusive with respect to whether shares are validly issued,
fully paid, and nonassessable.2 1 If watered stock problems remain under
15. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-25 (Repl. Pamp. 1983) follows MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 25
(1969).
16. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-18 (Repl. Pamp. 1983) follows MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 18
(1969) (amended 1980).
17. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 18 (1969)(amended 1979).
18. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 54(3) (1969)(amended 1979).
19. REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.21. See deviation between official version and version
contained in REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (Exposure Draft 1983).
20. REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.21 (1984).
21. Id.
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the 1984 Revised MBCA, it is not because the provisions of the MBCA
may be construed to establish such liability.
22
In light of the history and complexity of watered stock issues, the New
Mexico Amendments create unnecessary ambiguities. The preferable ap-
proach would be to follow the lead of the 1984 Revised MBCA and
eliminate entirely the concept of minimum consideration from the sta-
tutory schema as well as providing for the optional use of par value for
purposes specified by the drafters of the 1980 amendments to the MBCA
and the 1984 Revised MBCA.
B. A Continuing Need for the "De Facto" Doctrine?
The combination of sections 56 and 146 of the MBCA was intended
to eliminate the need for the "de facto corporation" and "corporation by
estoppel" doctrines.23 Under section 56, corporate existence begins upon
the issuance of the certificate of incorporation;24 section 146 imposes joint
and several liability on "all persons who assume to act as a corporation
without authority . . . ."2 Prior to the New Mexico Amendments, these
provisions were codified in sections 53-12-4 and 53-18-9 of the Act.
Accordingly, in New Mexico as under the MBCA, there could be little
tolerance for the argument that persons should be treated as though they
were operating in the corporate form even though no certificate estab-
lishing a corporation as a de jure entity had been issued. The New Mexico
Amendments changed section 53-12-4 to make the date of delivery of the
articles of incorporation to the filing office rather than the date of issuance
of the certificate of incorporation the moment that de jure corporate
existence begins. 26 This change in section 53-12-4 was intended to al-
leviate certain administrative problems of the State Corporation Com-
mission. 2' However, amended section 53-12-4 establishes a period of
uncertainty from the date of filing to the date of issuance of the certificate
or notice of rejection. 2' The State Corporation Commission must give
notice of rejection within 15 days, but presumably such notice need only
22. It may be theoretically impossible to abrogate watered stock liability completely. Statutory
schema generally do not prevent a corporation from including minimum consideration provisions in
its articles of incorporation. Nor do they preclude a board of directors from establishing minimum
consideration terms for a specific issuance of shares. Any time the corporation or the board of
directors takes such action, watered stock liability may arise based upon common law doctrines.
23. MODEL BusINESS CORP. AcT §§ 56, 146 official comments (1969).
24. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 56 (1969) (amended 1984).
25. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 146 (1969) (amended 1984).
26. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-12-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
27. See supra note 3, at 392-93.
28. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-12-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1983) cross-references N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-18-
2 (Repl. Pamp. 1983). The latter section provides a fifteen day period in which the State Corporation
Commission has to give notice that it has disapproved any document, including but not limited to
articles of incorporation, that may not be filed without the Commission's approval.
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be placed in the mail.29 Since actual receipt of notice of rejection would
not occur until after the 15 day period, the period of uncertainty could
extend well beyond 15 days. If the proposed officers and directors of the
corporation conduct business on behalf of the corporation during the
period of uncertainty, they may be personally liable under section 53-18-
9 unless the courts recognize the doctrines in New Mexico.
If the filing office accepts the articles of incorporation and issues the
certificate, corporate existence begins on the date of delivery to the filing
office. Thus, personal liability questions arising out of transactions during
the period of uncertainty will be rendered moot for most corporations.
The counterpart to section 146 in the 1984 Revised MBCA,3 ° if adopted
and used in conjunction with section 53-12-4 of the Act, would provide
relief from liability without resort to the doctrines. Section 2.04 of the
1984 Revised MBCA imposes personal liability only on those persons
who assume to act as or on behalf of a corporation knowing that there
was no incorporation. 3'
C. The Shareholder Majority Vote Trap
The New Mexico Amendments also contain a trap in which even a
careful practitioner may be ensnared. Most of the changes of the New
Mexico Amendments, such as those abolishing legal capital concepts and
establishing new standards for measuring the propriety of distributions
to shareholders, apply to all business corporations chartered under New
Mexico law, including Pre-amendment Corporations. This result is clear
not only because the Act no longer contains any provisions on par value
or utilizing the same to compute the propriety of distributions, but also
because section 53-18-10, as amended, provides that the Act applies to
all existing corporations. 2
If section 53-18-10 were the sole provision on the applicability of the
New Mexico Amendments to Pre-amendment Corporations, no problem
would have been created. The New Mexico Amendments, however, con-
tained a second provision governing the applicability to Pre-amendment
Corporations of changes to other statutory provisions, including, but not
limited to, sections 53-13-2, 53-14-3, 53-15-2, and 53-16-3, which pre-
scribe minimum shareholder vote requirements for the approval of fun-
damental corporate transactions such as mergers, sales of assets, amendments
to articles and dissolution.33 Under those sections,34 the minimum vote
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-18-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1983) refers to the "giving" of notice by the State
Corporation Commission rather than receipt by the person entitled to receive notice.
30. See REV. MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 2.04 (1984).
31. Id.
32. N.M. STAT. ANN. §53-18-10 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
33. Id. at §§53-13-2, 53-14-3, 53-15-2, 53-16-3.
34. Id.
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required for approval of these transactions was lowered from two-thirds
to a simple majority. Section 53-18-6.1 requires Pre-amendment Cor-
porations to amend their articles of incorporation in order to take advan-
tage of the lower voting threshold. 35 Any such amendment to a corporation's
articles of incorporation would require the higher minimum vote require-
ment of prior law. A provision such as 53-18-6.1 was evidently deemed
desirable because the higher minimum vote may have been a feature of
the balance of control agreed to by shareholders in a Pre-amendment
Corporation.
Unfortunately, neither section 53-18-10 nor section 53-18-6.1 cross-
references the other. If counsel, concerned about the applicability of the
lower voting requirements to Pre-amendment Corporations, looks for an
express statutory provision on applicability to existing corporations and
finds section 53-18-10 first, counsel could conclude erroneously (but
perhaps reasonably) that the lower voting requirements of the New Mexico
Amendments apply. The effect of counsel's erroneous conclusion may be
the approval of corporate action with less than the statutorily prescribed
vote. Under such circumstances such corporate action should be invalid,
absent other compelling factors. 36
II. RECENT NEW MEXICO DECISIONS
A. Corporate Law
1. Disregarding Corporateness
That a corporation may be formed to shield the owners from personal
liability is a venerable principle of American jurisprudence as well as an
important incentive to private sector economic development. This prin-
ciple is founded upon the fiction that the corporation is a legal persona
separate and distinct from its owners. It is also settled that the courts may
disregard the corporate entity under compelling circumstances. The New
Mexico appellate courts recently decided three cases that illuminate New
Mexico law on the separate entity status of the corporation and on the
disregard of the corporate entity in the context of affiliated or subsidiary
corporations. The burden continues to be a difficult one: those requesting
that the court disregard the corporate entity lost all three cases.
Boothe Financial Corp. v. Loretto Block, Inc.,37 involved a lease to a
tenant corporation and an option to purchase the underlying property held
by an affiliated party, an Oklahoma limited partnership. The option was
35. Id. at §53-18-6.1.
36. A court is not precluded from applying equitable precepts to a dispute over duly and properly
approved corporate action. Thus, a court may be influenced by the financial impact of the action on
the corporation, third parties and shareholders of the corporation.
37. 97 N.M. 496, 641 P.2d 527 (Ct. App. 1982).
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obtained by the partnership after the creation of the lease but before its
acquisition of the tenant corporation.3" The partnership exercised the
option and sought possession of the leased premises during the period
between the termination of the lease and the closing of the purchase
transaction pursuant to the exercise of the option.39 The partnership asked
the court to disregard the fact that it was an entity legally separate and
distinct from the tenant corporation.' The partnership sought to avail
itself of the rule that when a tenant in possession exercises an option to
purchase, the relationship is transformed from a landlord-tenant relation-
ship to a vendor-purchaser relationship such that the purchaser has eq-
uitable title and is entitled to remain in possession."
The trial court refused to disregard the separate entity status of the
tenant corporation and the partnership.2 The court ruled in favor of the
lessor-optionor on the grounds that the option was held by the partnership
which was not the same legal entity as the lessee under the lease. 3 The
New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed on two grounds. First, the option
tenant in possession rule only applies where the option is contained in
the lease agreement." Second, the rule that a corporation is a separate
entity from its stockholders applies even where a sole shareholder owns
all the stock. 5 The limited partnership, accordingly, did not fall within
the scope of the option tenant in possession rule because it was not the
legal entity with tenant status and the option was not a part of the lease
agreement. '
The strict adherence to the separate entity approach of Boothe Financial
Corp. should be a lesson for attorneys dealing with corporate lessees.
This caveat is appropriate for lawyers whether representing the landlord
or tenant. The pitfalls are particularly treacherous where option rights,
transfer of the leasehold or the acquisition of a lessee is involved. Im-
portant rights and obligations may depend upon which entity is the formal
party to a lease.
One theory which the courts have relied on to disregard the corporate
entity is the "alter ego" theory. In Cruttenden v. Mantura,47 the New
Mexico Supreme Court reiterated the rule that subsidiary and parent
corporations are ordinarily treated as strictly separate and independent
38. Id. at 498, 641 P.2d at 529.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 499, 641 P.2d at 530.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 498, 641 P.2d at 529.
44. Id. at 499, 641 P.2d at 530. The option was created in a separate document.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 97 N.M. 432, 640 P.2d 932 (1982).
[Vol. 17
CORPORATE LAW
entities. However, a subsidiary may be deemed the alter ego of the parent
corporation where the control by the parent "is so complete as to render
the subsidiary an instrumentality of the parent.''4
The New Mexico Supreme Court articulated a ten-factor test to deter-
mine whether a subsidiary corporation is the alter ego of the parent.49 As
the court pointed out, all of the factors need not be present to establish
an alter ego but a combination of several factors is required. This is
important because several of the ten factors are commonly found in parent-
subsidiary arrangements.5" The court, however, did not indicate which
factors or combinations thereof have greater weight. Thus, the factors,
while useful, epitomize the historical difficulty the courts have had ar-
ticulating meaningful objective standards for determining when the cor-
porate form should be disregarded.5
Harlow v. Fibron"2 presents a corporate creditor's attempt to "pierce
the corporate veil" to impose liability on a controlling shareholder and
two other corporations affiliated with the controlling shareholder. Harlow
purchased defective pipe from Kinetics, Inc. and obtained a judgment
against it.53 After the judgment was obtained, all of the outstanding shares
of Kinetics were sold to Fibron Corporation without Harlow's knowl-
48. Id. at 434, 640 P.2d at 934.
49. The factors are:
(1) The parent corporation owns all or majority of the capital stock of the sub-
sidiary.
(2) The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or officers.
(3) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary.
(4) The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital stock of the subsidiary or
otherwise causes its incorporation.
(5) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
(6) The parent corporation pays the salaries or expenses or losses of the subsidiary.
(7) The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent corporation
or no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent corporation.
(8) In the papers of the parent corporation, and in the statements of its officers,
'the subsidiary' is referred to as such or as a department or division.
(9) The directors or executives do not act independently in the interest of the
subsidiary but take direction from the parent corporation.
(10) The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary as a separate legal entity
are not observed.
id. at 434-35, 640 P.2d at 934-35.
50. Many parent-subsidiary arrangements involve common officers and directors. Moreover, par-
ent corporations are by definition the primary source of capital financing for a subsidiary and many
subsidiaries are wholly owned by a single parent corporation. That the case law lists these conditions
as factors to be considered emphasizes the lack of coherency in justifying the imposition of veil-
piercing remedies. One reason for the incoherency is that the law expressly permits the formation
of a corporation to limit liability. However, the courts have been far less reluctant to nail parent
corporations than individual shareholders. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEx. L. REV. 979,
992-93 (1971).
51. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 227, notes I and 2 (3d. ed. 1986).
52. 100 N.M. 379, 671 P.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1983).
53. 100 N.M. at 381, 671 P.2d at 42.
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edge.54 When all the assets (except the Kinetics shares) of Fibron were
destroyed by fire, Harlow joined Midwest Equipment Company, Mid-
Tex Construction Company and James Brock, the controlling shareholder
of Kinetics before it was acquired by Fibron.5 Harlow claimed that
Midwest, Mid-Tex and Brock were alter egos of Kinetics. 6
The apparent basis of the plaintiff's claim against Brock was that, as
the founder and controlling shareholder of Kinetics, he had undercapi-
talized Kinetics by causing it to incur an initial indebtedness to himself. 7
Furthermore, he had personally transferred funds from time to time to
Kinetics to pay its creditors.58 Harlow's argument that Midwest and Mid-
Tex were alter egos of Kinetics was based upon an analysis of the Crut-
tenden factors, at least two of which were present: (1) common officers
and directors; and (2) commingling of finances and other matters. First,
Brock served as the chief executive officer and president of each cor-
poration. 9 Second, Midwest and Mid-Tex transferred money to Kinetics,
paid all of Kinetics' expenses and handled Kinetics accounting on their
books.' ° However, the corporations did not own any Kinetics stock, and
except for the payment of expenses and handling of financial matters,
the corporations were not related to Kinetics. 6
The trial court, respecting the separate nature of the entities, rendered
a judgment in favor of the defendants, and the New Mexico Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that a piercing the corporate veil claim is not
complete merely by alleging alter ego.6 2 The court, relying upon Krendl
and Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry,63 then
articulated the requisite elements of the claim:' instrumentality, improper
purpose, and proximate causation.65 The court stated that New Mexico
cases refer to the instrumentality theory as the alter ego doctrine.66 In-
strumentality in the subsidiary or affiliated corporation context was ex-
plained in terms of which entity's purposes were furthered and of domination:
A plaintiff must prove that the subsidiary or other subservient cor-
poration was operated not in a legitimate fashion, to serve the valid
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 382, 671 P.2d at 43.
63. 55 DENVER L. J. I (1978).
64. The specific elements of a piercing the corporate veil action may vary by jurisdiction. See
supra notes 67-68.
65. Harlow, 100 N.M. at 382, 671 P.2d at 43.
66. Id.
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goals and purposes of that corporation but that it functioned under
the domination and control and for the purposes of some dominant
party.
67
The quoted language, although frequently used by courts and com-
mentators, encompasses many ordinary parent-subsidiary relationships.
Nevertheless, the law permits corporations to be formed for the purpose
of limiting the personal liability of owners, and courts are reluctant to
disregard the corporate entity.
The improper purpose element is a product of such reluctance. A plain-
tiff has only satisfied one element with a showing of alter ego. Courts
will not deviate from a strict separate entity approach unless the corporate
entity has been used for an improper purpose. The concept resembles but
is not identical to the fraudulent purpose requirement used in New York
and other jurisdictions.68 Some jurisdictions require a strong showing of
improper purpose when the imposition of shareholder liability is requested
but less when the question involves matters such as personal jurisdiction. 69
The New Mexico Court of Appeals did not discuss the nature of an
"improper purpose" because the trial court had found no "improper,
inequitable, unfair, illegal, unjust or fraudulent act or actions on the part
of"' 7 Brock, Midwest and Mid-Tex. That finding was supported by their
advancement of more than $1,000,000 to Kinetics, a business that was
a losing venture at the time. 7' The court, emphasizing the equitable nature
of the remedy, indicates that a different result may have been warranted
if Brock or the corporations had taken money out of Kinetics or raided
71its assets.
Both Cruttenden and Harlow involve the alter ego doctrine in parent
or affiliated corporation settings. Cruttenden and Harlow serve as a re-
minder that corporate creditors should deal on a formal basis with sub-
sidiary or affiliated corporations, seeking formal guarantees when the
financial circumstances or continued well-being of the corporation that
is the formal party to the transaction is questionable. When the dealings
become as informal and as intertwined as they did in Harlow, creditors
and parties related to the corporate obligor may find themselves in the
midst of expensive litigation that might have been avoided.
67. Id. (citing Krendl and Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DENVER
L. J. 1, 15 (1978)).
68. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1981); Walcholsky v. Carlton,
18 N.Y.2d 414, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 223 N.E.2d 6 (1966).
69. Marine Midland Bank, 664 F.2d 899 (applying New York law); see also State v. MacPherson,
62 N.M. 308, 309 P.2d 981 (1957) (applying New Mexico law).
70. Harlow, 100 N.M. at 383, 671 P.2d at 44.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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B. Challenges of Minority Shareholders to Majority Control
Minority shareholders who objected to the management of the majority
fared no better during the survey period than plaintiffs who requested the
courts to disregard the corporate entity. Schwartzman v. Schwartzman
Packing Co.7 3 involved a dispute between family members in a closely-
held corporation. The minority shareholders filed suit against the cor-
poration and the majority shareholders, complaining of conduct oppres-
sive to the minority shareholders and injurious to the corporation.74
Prior to the trial, the corporation had agreed to allow a reasonable
inspection of the corporate books and records." The minority shareholders
sent teams of three to six accountants during normal business hours to
examine the corporate books and records.7 6 When the company's business
was disrupted, the inspection was restricted to nonbusiness hours.77
The minority shareholders objected to the restriction and moved the
trial court to compel the company to permit 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. inspections.78
The trial court denied the request and ordered one additional day for the
completion of the examination." 9 On appeal, the minority shareholders
contended that the limits placed on their examination of the books and
records was unlawful.80
Although the case was one of first impression in New Mexico, it did
not present any novel questions on the issue of the right to inspect.
However, Schwartzman demonstrated the inherent tensions concomitant
with a shareholder's right to inspect corporate books and records. 81 On
the one hand, a shareholder is an owner entitled to know what his or her
business is doing. On the other hand, the corporation has a business to
operate, and inspections require time and space that can interfere with
that operation. The right to inspect therefore is not an unbridled one; and
a shareholder may not demand unreasonable access to corporate books
and records.
The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the trial court and clarified
the scope of the right to inspect in New Mexico. The Court said that a
shareholder's right to inspect corporate books and records at reasonable
times and places 82 was recognized at common law and exists indepen-
dently of statute.83 Moreover, the court noted that the MBCA provisions84
73. 99 N.M. 436, 659 P.2d 888 (1983).
74. Id. at 438, 659 P.2d at 890.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 439, 659 P.2d at 891.
80. Id. at 438, 659 P.2d at 890.
81. Id. at 439-40, 659 P.2d at 890-91.
82. Id. at 439, 659 P.2d at 891.
83. N.M. STAT. ANN. §53-11-50 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
84. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 52 (1969).
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on which section 53-1 1-50 is based have been construed to enlarge, rather
than limit, the common law right to inspect.85
Whether the Act expanded or limited the common law right to inspect
was not in question since the corporation conceded that the minority
shareholders had a right to inspect the books and records.86 Nor did the
corporation argue that the minority shareholders could not take substantial
amounts of time or bring in expert representatives to assist in the in-
spection. The corporation argued that the right to inspect was not an
arbitrary one entitling plaintiffs to disrupt the day-to-day business of the
company for long periods of time. s
The New Mexico Supreme Court correctly rejected the minority share-
holders' claim that they had an unlimited right to inspect without regard
to the hardship imposed upon the corporation. Section 53-11-50 specif-
ically prescribes that the examination be "at any reasonable time". 88 In
discussing reasonableness, the court made two noteworthy points. First,
reasonableness apparently may be measured by the extent to which an
inspection does not unduly interfere with the regular business of the
company.89 A requesting shareholder need not accept the company's time
frame for the inspection and could insist upon another time as long as
the examination does not unduly interfere with the carrying on of the
company's business. Second, reasonableness is to be determined on a
case by case basis.9 Trial courts have discretion in determining when
and in what manner the right to inspect may be exercised.9'
The minority shareholders also sought several other remedies from the
court. First, they sought to wrest control from the majority with the
appointment of a master and receiver.92 If they had been successful with
that strategy, their victory may have been pyrrhic as the expenses of a
master or receiver can consume a considerable amount of the corporate
assets. In any event, the remedy is an extraordinary equitable remedy
and rarely granted.93
Second, they asked the court to dissolve the corporation on the basis
of allegedly oppressive conduct on the part of the corporation and the
85. Bishop's Estate v. Antilles Enterprises, 252 F.2d 498 (3d Cir. 1958); Tucson Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Shantz, 5 Ariz. App. 511, 428 P.2d 686 (1967); Leisner v. Kent Investors, Inc., 62 Misc.2d
132, 302 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1970); Meyer v. Ford Indus., 272 Or. 531, 538 P.2d 353 (1975); Texas
Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Godwin, 397 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)(writ ref'd n.r.e).
86. Schwartzman, 99 N.M. at 439, 659 P.2d at 891.
87. Id.
88. N.M. STAT. ANN. §53-11-50 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
89. Schwartzman, 99 N.M. at 441, 659 P.2d at 893.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. d.
93. 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1039 (Rev. Perm.
1979). The remedy is so extremely expensive that the transactions costs are usually prohibitive.
POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1484 (4th ed. 1919).
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controlling shareholders.?' Although that remedy is also extraordinary and
rarely granted, it has an express statutory basis." Plaintiffs also asked
for pecuniary damages and restitution to the corporation of allegedly
misappropriated assets.' The trial court dismissed some claims and granted
summary judgment to the defendants on the other claims and the supreme
court affirmed.97
Dilaconi v. New Cal Corp." presents another instance where minority
shareholders in a closely-held family corporation complained of abuse
by the majority shareholders. The minority shareholders sought a pot-
pourri of remedies including an accounting, restoration of corporate as-
sets, injunctive relief, removal of corporate officers, appointment of a
receiver and liquidation of the corporation. 9 The principal shareholder,
his wife and son were directors of and, respectively, president, secretary
and vice president of the corporation. " Sharing a characteristic of many
closely-held corporations, New Cal was managed very informally and
the corporation's affairs and the principal shareholder's personal business
were intermingled.' Accordingly, either the directors or the principal
shareholder, acting in his capacity as an officer of the corporation, ap-
proved several transactions between the corporation and the principal
shareholder or for his benefito 2
While a previous survey article discussed the court of appeals' result,'0 3
this Article will examine the majority shareholder's successful use of the
business judgment rule to defend against the minority shareholders' claims
that the directors and officers breached their fiduciary duties to the cor-
poration. The business judgment rule subjects the actions of directors to
judicial scrutiny, but operates to shield the decisions of directors from
second guessing by the courts. The business judgment rule is applied
where the directors act (1) within their authority on a reasonable basis,
(2) in good faith, and (3) with an honest belief that they were acting in
the best interests of the corporation. "
Commentators generally agree that the business judgment rule is in-
applicable where directors have a conflict of interest.0 5 Others suggest
94. Schwartzman, 99 N.M. at 438, 659 P.2d at 890.
95. N.M. STAT. ANN. §53-16-16 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
96. Schwartzman, 99 N.M. at 438, 659 P.2d at 890.
97. Id.
98. 97 N.M. 782, 643 P.2d 1234 (Ct. App. 1982).
99. Id. at 783, 643 P.2d at 1235.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 783-87, 643 P.2d at 1235-39.
102. Id.
103. Johnson, Commercial Law, 14 N.M. L. REv. 45, 60 (1984).
104. Dilaconi, 97 N.M. at 788, 643 P.2d at 1240.
105. H.G. HENN & J.R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §§ 242-243 (1983); R. CLARKE,
CORPORATE LAW § 3.5 (1986).
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that the business judgment rule is applicable unless the directors are tainted
by a disabling conflict. 0 6 It is not always clear whether a conflict rises
to the level of being "disabling". For example, in Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien,'07 one of the leading cases exemplifying this enigma, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that the interested directors of a subsidiary corpo-
ration were entitled to use the business judgment rule with respect to
transactions which benefited all shareholders or which were within the
best interests of the subsidiary corporation. '08 However, the court stated
that directors could not use the defense with respect to transactions that
benefited only the parent corporation. 09
Even if the directors in Dilaconi possessed a disabling conflict of
interest, the result reached by the application of the business judgment
rule was consistent with prior New Mexico case law"0 applicable to such
transactions and the law of several other jurisdictions. "' The significance
of which standard is applicable has to do with the degree of scrutiny
required of a court. The business judgment rule connotes judicial def-
erence and minimal scrutiny.
Interestingly, Judge Sutin argued in his dissent that transactions between
a corporation and interested directors should be subjected to careful scru-
tiny. 2 However, he did not argue that the review provided by the business
judgment rule was insufficient. Instead he took the position that the trial
court did not discharge, and the court of appeals by its reliance on the
trial court did not exact, the necessary degree of review.' The majority,
however, may have been convinced that the trial court did subject the
transactions to exacting scrutiny and found that the directors and officers
satisfied their burden of proof.' "' The excerpt from the trial court's findings
evokes images of a referee vigorously making a call he is sure will be
controversial so that the contestants and the higher authorities will know
he is certain of what he saw.' ' Perhaps the most important finding the
106. See e.g. Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 111-16
(1979); Steinberg, Some Thoughts on the Regulation of Tender Offers, 43 MD. L. REV. 240, 242
(1984).
107. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
108. Id. at 720.
109. Id. at 723.
110. G 0 S Cattle Co. v. Bragaw's Heirs, 38 N.M. 105, 109, 28 P.2d 529, 531 (1933). In fact,
the majority in Dilaconi acknowledged that rigorous scrutiny was required, notwithstanding its
application of the business judgment rule.
Ill. See generally H. HENN AND J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §§ 235-38 (3d. ed.
1983).
112. Dilaconi, 97 N.M. at 791, 643 P.2d at 1243.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 788-91, 643 P.2d at 1240-43.
115. The trial court made, among others, the following findings of fact:
5. The major problem with the business relation of the parties is, and has been,
the fact that the plaintiffs are minority stockholders in a closely held corporation;
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
trial court made was that the dispute was nothing more than a fundamental
disagreement over the operations of the corporation. 6
Dilaconi and Schwartzman illustrate that the corporate governance
norm is majority rule. The minority shareholder must be able to show
more than a dispute over the management, direction and business policies
of the corporation. If the minority shareholder wishes to alter the norm,
he or she must do so at the time of buying into the corporation. 7 A court
will not provide relief if it finds that a subsequent disagreement over
management is the heart of the dispute.
C. Foreign Corporations
Corporate counsel are frequently asked to render "doing business"
opinions to foreign corporations with respect to business transactions that
occur within New Mexico. The typical opinion contemplates whether the
transactions constitute doing business for the purposes of: (1) qualification
as a foreign corporation under the New Mexico Business Corporation
Act; (2) state taxation of corporate income; and (3) long-arm jurisdiction.
The amount of activity required usually varies for each of these issues.
Generally, long-arm jurisdiction requires less activity than that which is
necessary for either qualification or taxation purposes. 8 Kathrein v. Park-
the majority stockholder has used his controlling interest in the conduct of the
business of the corporation, has made decisions as to the incurring of indebt-
edness, has planned the development of the land, has made sales, and has made
business decisions with respect to the manner in which the affairs of the cor-
poration are to be managed. The majority of the business decisions made by
the corporation are questioned by and objected to by the minority stockholders.
It is the view of the Court that the problem is inherent in the business rela-
tionships of the parties and their respective interests in the corporation, and is
not a problem capable of resolution by the Court.
Id. at 784, 643 P.2d at 1236.
116. Id.
117. A prospective buyer, particularly in the closed corporation context, may have the opportunity
to negotiate deviations to the corporate norm in the form of provisions of the articles of incorporation,
bylaws and other corporate governance documents and shareholder agreements. If the buyer does
not negotiate such terms, then the statutory norm will prevail.
118. N.M. STAT. ANN. §53-17-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1983) provides that "[n]o foreign corporation
shall transact business in this state until it has procured a certificate." Section 53-17-1 also explicitly
sets forth eleven categories of transactions that will not constitute doing business thereunder. Several
of those factors might independently give rise to personal jurisdiction or subject the corporation to
taxation by the State of New Mexico.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16 (1978) provides that '[alny person ...who ...does any of the
acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or his personal representative to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from: (I) the transaction of
any business within this state. ... The New Mexico courts have consistently recognized that the
activities that constitute doing business under the long arm statute are not coterminous with the
degree of activities required under the foreign corporation qualification statute. They further recognize
that a foreign corporation may be subject to the jurisdiction of the New Mexico courts but not
required to qualify to do business. Riblet Tramway Co. v. Monte Verde Corp., 453 F.2d 313 (10th
Cir. 1972); Winward v. Holly Creek Mills, Inc., 83 N.M. 469, 493 P.2d 954 (1972); see also W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 8712 (Rev. Perm. Ed. 1979).
N.M. STT. ANN. §7-2A-3.A (Repl. Pamp. 1983) imposes a tax on the income of domestic
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view Meadows, Inc." 9 and Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Bendix
Control Div. 20 demonstrate the degree of activity that will constitute doing
business for long-arm jurisdiction.
Under the New Mexico long-arm statute,' 2 ' jurisdiction is triggered if
the out-of-state defendant engages in one of the specified activities within
New Mexico, the cause of action arises out of such activities, and the
International Shoe'22 due process requirements are satisfied. In Kathrein,
the injury occurred at the corporation's place of business in Arizona, but
the corporation carried on certain activities in New Mexico related to its
Arizona operations.'23 The corporation advertised its Arizona alcoholic
treatment center in the yellow pages of the Albuquerque telephone di-
rectory and sought referrals from a New Mexico resident."'2 In addition,
the corporation mailed a brochure to the plaintiff, whose husband was
being treated at the facility, inviting her to Arizona to participate in a
family program, and telephoned her in New Mexico encouraging her
attendance. '
25
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that those activities constituted
doing business"a in New Mexico within the scope of the long-arm statute 27
and were sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process considera-
tions. 2' Furthermore, the court held that the invitation mailed to plaintiff
was an integral part of the corporation's operations at the Arizona facility
so that her injury suffered there arose out of the corporation's activities
within New Mexico. 29
Aetna Casualty serves as a warning to lawyers who issue "doing busi-
ness" opinions to foreign corporations which sell products to New Mexico
residents, even if the sale and delivery take place outside New Mexico.
In Aetna Casualty, Bendix manufactured parts of a helicopter that crashed
in New Mexico injuring a passenger. 3 The passenger's employer and
corporations and foreign corporations "employed or engaged in the transaction of business in, into
or from this state on deriving income from any property or employment within this state." In addition,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-2A-3.B (Repl. Pamp. 1986) imposes a corporate franchise tax upon domestic
and foreign corporations "employed or engaged in the transaction of business in, into or from this
state or deriving any income from any property or employment within this state . . . whether engaged
in active business or not but having or exercising its corporate franchise in this state." The language
is not as open-ended as § 38-1-16, nor as limiting as the language as § 53-17-1. Normally, doing
business requirements for taxation statutes are broader than under the corporate qualification statutes.
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 8465 (Rev. Perm. Ed. 1979).
119. 102 N.M. 75, 691 P.2d 462 (1984).
120. 101 N.M. 235, 680 P.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1984).
121. N.M. STAT. ANN. §38-1-16 (1978).
122. Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
123. 102 N.M. at 76, 691 P.2d at 463.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 77, 691 P.2d at 464.
127. Id. at 76-77, 691 P.2d at 463-64.
128. Id. at 76, 691 P.2d at 463.
129. Id. at 77, 691 P.2d at 464.
130. 101 N.M. at 237, 680 P.2d at 618.
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its' insurer then sued, among others, Bendix to recover workman's com-
pensation benefits paid to the passenger.' 3' Bendix responded with a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 32 The Court of Appeals
held that the New Mexico long-arm statute was applicable and reversed
the trial court's grant of the motion. '33
The operative provision of the long-arm statute, however, was not the
"doing business" clause set forth in section 38-l-16(A)(1)134 but the tort
clause set forth in section 38-1-16(A)(3). 35 The commission of a tort in
New Mexico is one of the specified activities giving rise to long-arm
jurisdiction. 3 6 If a negligently manufactured product causes injury in New
Mexico, the New Mexico Supreme Court has held that the tort occurs in
New Mexico for the purposes of the long-arm statute. 37 Accordingly, if
the selling corporation has sufficient other contacts with New Mexico,
long-arm jurisdiction may be triggered.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 238, 680 P.2d at 619.
133. Id. at 238, 241, 680 P.2d at 619, 622.
134. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-I-16(A)(I) (1978).
135. Id. at § 38-1-16(A)(3).
136. Id. at § 38-1-16(A)(3).
137. Roberts v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 100 N.M. 363, 670 P.2d 974 (Ct. App. 1983).
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